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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATTI SIMONSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT GORDON TRAVIS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 19148 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against Defendant 
for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. 
Because Plaintiff executed a release, the sole issue in this 
appeal is the validity of the release and its effect upon 
Plaintiff's claim. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Respondent agrees with the statement conatined 
in Appellant's Brief as to the procedural events occurring in 
this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
decision of no cause of action based upon the validity of the 
release executed by Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent essentially agrees with the state-
ment of facts contained in the Brief of Appellant. However, 
Appellant has taken the liberty in some instances of drawing 
inferences contrary to the lower court's decision and in 
incorrectly characterizing the testimony of Defendant's 
insurance adjuster. For this reason, and for the purpose of 
presenting the testimony in chronological order, Respondent 
shall restate the factual proof. 
The plaintiff was involved in a two-car intersection 
accident at Roy, Utah on February 1, 1978. Several days after 
the accident she contacted Defendant's insurance company, State 
Farm Insurance, concerning the damage to her car. (Tr. 20). 
Shortly thereafter, a State Farm adjuster went to Appellant's 
home and made an estimate as to the amount of damage. 
The estimate was for a total of $622.45. (Ex. 1). 
(Tr. 21-22) 
Approximately five weeks subsequent to the accident the 
plaintiff went to the State Farm claims office on Harrison 
Boulevard and had a conversation with a secretary. Plaintiff 
testified that she refused to sign a release that had been 
previously prepared by the adjuster Mr. Homer Randall. Mr. 
Randall was not present the day she first visited the State 
Farm office. (Tr. 25). She examined a release that had been 
previously prepared by Mr. Randall. (Ex. 2). She stated that 
she could not recall whether the release contained a typewritten 
clause above the printed form during this first visit. (Tr. 31) . 
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Plaintiff testified that the secretary at State Farm told 
her that she would have to sign the release if she wanted to 
get the check for her car repair. She recalled that upon reading 
the release agreement that it "didn't sound right" because she 
did not want to release everything. She stated that the release 
sounded like she was releasing all of her claims and not just 
her property damage. (Tr. 24). 
During this period of time the plaintiff stated she was 
going to a doctor for treatment from the accident but did not 
know the extent of any injuries at that point in time. (Tr. 23) 
Plaintiff explained that because of her medical bills, her con-
cern over her personal injuries, and the language contained in 
the release form she refused to sign the document. (Tr. 24). 
It was her position that she had never agreed to release any-
thing other than her claims for property damages. Plaintiff 
denied being told by the secretary that the property damage 
claim could not be paid until all of the claims had been settled. 
(Tr. 33). 
Plaintiff recalled that the following day Mr. Randall called 
her on the phone to ask her why she refused to sign the release. 
She told him that she did not understand the release very good 
and that it seemed like she was releasing everything including 
her personal and medical claims. She told him, according to her 
testimony, that she only wanted the car taken care of and that 
she was still seeing a doctor. She related that she wanted her 
medical bills and personal injuries kept open. (Tr. 25-26). 
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She stated that Mr. Randall told her thc:lt the release was 
only for her property damage but that Randall never soeci-
fically mentioned any of the typed language contained in the 
release. He never related this language into his supposed 
statement that the release was only covering property damage. 
( Tr . 2 6 - 27 ) . 
Mr. Randall, on the other hand, testified that he had 
prepared the release on a standard form utilized by State Farm. 
(Tr. 7). The typed portion on the exhibit contained a standard 
State Farm clause which was utilized at that time for the purpose 
of preserving subrogation rights of a claimant's own no-fault 
insurer. (Tr. 8 , 12, 3 5) . 
Randall stated that he personally filled out the handwritten 
portion of the release. (Tr. 8). The amount of $622.45 was the 
exact amount of the estimate for the property damage. (Tr. 9) 
Randall stated that he knew that the plaintiff was going to a 
doctor but did not know whether the doctor had released her from 
treatment. He also knew that she was insured under her own no-
fault policy which would have covered all of her medical bills 
up to a minimum of $2,000. He did not know the limits of her 
no-fault coverage but testified that most policies had no-fault 
coverage limits in excess of $2,000. (Tr. 12). He stated that 
in some cases you can estimate what the medical expenses of an 
injured party will be five weeks after the accident while in 
other cases you cannot. 
While Mr. Randall recalled having a conversation with 
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the plaintiff concerning the release, he could not truthfully 
state all of the substance of that conversation. He did not 
believe, however, that he could have told her that the release 
was only for property damage and that she did not need to worry 
about her other claims. (Tr. 16). He stated that as a standard 
procedure he would tell all claimants that the release would 
cover everything with the exception of the medical bills that 
State Farm would have to pay to the claimant's own insurance 
company. He testified that if there was an arrangement to 
only pay for the property damage that another type of form 
would have been utilized rather than the release form used 
in this instance. (Tr. 35). P.e explained that he would have 
used an advanced cost receipt form if the property damage only 
was being released. He stated that the form actually signed 
by Mrs. Simonson could not be used for that purpose and that 
people would not sign it because it was a general release. (Tr. 
36) • 
The day following her conversation with Mr. Randall, the 
plaintiff went back to the State Farm office and signed the 
exact form that she had previously refused to sign the day 
before. (Tr. 32). The secretary on this day also informed 
her that the release had to be signed in order for her to 
receive a check for the property damage on the car. (Tr. 33). 
Plaintiff stated that she had never personally met Homer 
Randall during any of these negotiations. (Tr. 25). She 
explained that she signed the release simply because she trusted 
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Homer Randall and did not think he would lie to her. (Tr. 
32) . 
During these negotiations Randall also agreed to pay an 
additional amount for a car rental. Accordingly, a second 
draft for $31.50 was given to the plaintiff on March 15, 1978. 
(Ex. 5). In addition to the $622 paid to the plaintiff for her 
automobile repair, State Farm also paid to Plaintiff's insurance 
carrier approximately $2,100 as reimbursement for their expendi-
tures under Plaintiff's no-fault insurance policy. (Tr. 37) . 
Plaintiff stated that her overall medical bills exceeded 
$5,000. Some of those bills had been paid by her no-fault 
carrier and by her own health insurance carrier, Blue Cross. 
She did not, however, submit many of the bills to Blue Cross 
and could not submit them at the time of trial because of 
untimeliness. (Tr. 29). 
Finally, Plaintiff testified that she had retained all of 
the money paid to her by State Farm and had not made any effort 
to give the money back after asserting that the release did not 
cover medical costs and personal injuries. (Tr. 30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN RCLING 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO INVALIDATE THE RELEASE. 
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in requiring 
her to carry the burden of proof in invalidating the release. 
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According to Plaintiff, it was Defendant's obligation to 
utilize the release as an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's 
lawsuit and was therefore incumbent upon the defendant to prove 
the validity of the release. (Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13) . 
This argument is erroneous. 
It is fundamental that once a party relying upon a release 
establishes the execution of the release by the other party, 
that the burden is on the releasor to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the release should be set aside. Witt v. 
\'latkins, 579 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1978); Fieser v. Stinnette, 509 
P.2d 1156 (Kan. 1973). 
This Court in Maxfield v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., 330 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1958) followed this rule and 
stated that one who attacks a release of liability has the 
burden of proving its invalidity. In addition, "Under Utah 
law, in order to overcome the effect of a release or other 
written instrument, the contrary evidence must be clear and 
convincing." (Id. at 1019). 
A review of the record shows that Plaintiff failed to 
meet this burden. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD EXECUTED A GENERAL 
RELEASE. 
Appellant argues in her brief that the release executed 
by the plaintiff was only a conditional release which did not 
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include claims for personal injuries or meJical expenses. She 
cites various rules of contractual construction arquing that 
the release either clearly excludes these types of claims or, 
in the alternative, that the release is ambiguous and requires 
parole evidence. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14-18). 
Respondent agrees that the document is unambiguous as a 
matter of law and that it is definitely a general release of 
all claims. As noted by Appellant herself, all of the provisions 
of a release must be construed together. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
17) . If the interpretation now given to the typed language by 
Appellant is correct then the majority of the language contained 
in the printed form has no effect. In other words, if the typed 
language exempts claims for personal injuries and medical expenses 
from the release, it is entirely inconsistent with the printed 
language which includes all claims "both to personal and property." 
An examination of this document as a whole shows that it 
is not inconsistent and that both the printed form and the typed 
portion are concerned with independent matters. The printed 
form, with ink insertions contained in parentheses, states the 
following: 
For the sole consideration of ($622.45) the 
receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, 
the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges 
(Robert G. Travis) and (his) heirs, executors, adminis-
trators, agents and assigns, and all other persons, 
firms or corporations liable or who might be claiwed 
to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to the 
undersigned but all expressly deny any liability, 
from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, 
causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature 
whatsoever, and particulary on account of all injuries, 
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known and unknown, both to person and property, which 
have resulted or may in the future develop from an 
accident which occurred on or about the (1st) day of 
(February, 1978) at or near (5700 South 1900 West, Roy, 
Utah . 
Undersigned hereby declares that the terms of 
this settlement have been completely read and are fully 
understood and are voluntarily accepted for the purpose 
of making a full and final compromise adjustment and 
settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, 
on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, 
and for the express purpose of precluding forever any 
further or additional claims arising out of the afore-
said accident. 
Undersigned hereby accepts draft or drafts as final 
payment of the consideration set forth above. (Ex. 2). 
(Emphasis added) . 
There can be no doubt that the language contained in the 
release related to all types of claims both for property damage 
and for personal injuries. Plaintiff herself admitted that when 
she read the release it "sounded like she was releasing everything." 
(Tr. 24). The printed release form, therefore, contains all of 
the elements of a general release. 
The typed clause above the printed portion of the release 
is not inconsistent. It states the following: 
The undersigned is not releasing any part of 
his claim for which he has received or will in the 
future receive payments under personal injury 
protection insurance available to him. The present 
or future subrogation rights of any insurer for 
making payments under such coverage is reserved. 
(Emphasis added). 
This clause simply states that any sum received by the 
claimant pursuant to his own personal injury protection 
insurance policy is not released and that his insurance carrier 
reserves any present or future subrogation right to be reimbursed 
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for that amount. The fact that the terms "personal injury 
protection insurance" and the term "such coverage'' is utilized 
in this clause clearly indicates the interpretation just recited 
rather than the notion of Appellant that this clause exempted 
personal injuries from the terms of the general release. 
Moreover, even if the release were deemed ambiguous, 
thereby allowing parol evidence to be admitted, there was no 
showing that Plaintiff had any understanding whatsoever of this 
clause or that she relied upon its insertion into the release 
form. Plaintiff could not recall when the clause was inserted 
and never attempted to state what she believed its intent to be. 
The document, on its own face, therefore, is a complete 
bar to Plaintiff's action in the absence of showing of mutual 
mistake, fraud or other equitable grounds to defeat the clear 
meaning of the language. Appellant failed to meet this burden 
as will be discussed infra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDitlG 
CONSIDERATION FOR A GENERAL RELEASE. 
While the lower court did not make a specific finding 
of consideration for the release, the finding of such considera-
tion was implied. Appellant argues, however, that since Plain-
tiff was only paid the same amount as the estimated damage to 
her property that she therefore had no consideration for the 
release of her personal injury claims. Appellant then argues 
that because of the inadequacy of the consideration the general 
-10-
release cannot be said to extend to personal injuries and 
special damages. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20-21). Such an 
argument is without merit. 
A release is a surrender of a claim which may be given 
for less than full consideration or even gratuitously. DeNike 
v. Mowery, 418 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1966) Plaintiff by the terms 
of the release itself received $622. Certainly, by any standard 
this sum of money was itself adequate to support consideration 
of the agreement. 
Appellant forgets that while State Farm Insurance believed 
that its insured was probably responsible for the accident, it 
had no obligation to pay for the property damage until a complete 
and thorough investigation had been conducted or, in the extreme, 
until the matter had been litigated and a judgment rendered. 
State Farm agreed to short cut this procedure and to pay the 
property damage sum immediately. 
Plaintiff may at the time have thought her injuries were 
minimal, that she suffered no compensable injuries, and that 
her own insurance carrier would cover all of her medical and 
lost wages expenses. Plaintiff obviously wished to receive the 
compensation for her automobile's damage immediately without 
further delay. State Farm, on the other hand, agreed to pay 
this amount immediately upon the condition that she would make 
no future claims of any nature against it. These bargained for 
promises together with the consideration of the actual monetary 
amount was sufficient to sustain the adequacy of the considera-
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tion for the release. 
Clearly, both parties received a benefit and both parties 
suffered a detriment. It was not necessary that Plaintiff be 
allotted a certain consideration for each of her possible 
claims arising from the accident. The lower court decision was 
not in error. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING RELATING 
TO TENDER IS BASIC TO THE ISSUES 
RAISED ON THIS APPEAL. 
The lower court noted in its Findings of Fact that since 
executing the release of March 8, 1978 the plaintiff had retained 
all of the consideration she received as a condition of giving 
the release. (Tr. 38). Appellant argues extensively that this 
finding as to tender invalidated the court's decision of a valid 
release. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22-24). 
Respondent does not believe that the finding of tender is 
relevant to this appeal. Certainly, it is undisputable that 
Plaintiff did not tender back any amount of the money she receive 
from State Farm. As such, the finding of fact is correct. 
Respondent has never contended that the failure to tender 
these amounts was the basis for the court's decision in finding 
the release to prohibit Plaintiff from making any further claims. 
The question of tender normally goes to ratification of an act. 
The fact that Plaintiff failed to tender any amount during the 
numerous years between the execution of the agreement and the 
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corrunencement of the lawsuit would be some evidence of her 
ratification of the release agreement but certainly would not 
be conclusive for sustaining the court's finding of validity 
of the release. There is no evidence that the lower court 
relied upon the failure to tender as the sole basis for the 
decision and therefore any discussion as to the requirement of 
a tender in this type of situation is merely academic. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ANY CLAIM OF FRAUD 
IN THE EXECUTION OF THE RELEASE AND THE 
LOWER COURT DECISION UPHOLDING THE 
RELEASE IS THEREFORE CORRECT. 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that evidence of 
fraud must be clear, precise and indubitable and must be proved 
with clear and convincing evidence. Kelley v. Salt Lake Trans-
portation Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941); In re Swan Estate v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). 
The record in this case does not support any claim of 
Plaintiff that she was fraudulently induced to execute the 
release now in contention. The basis of any claim she can now 
assert is that she was tricked by Mr. Randall into signing the 
release form. This claim by Plaintiff is contradicted by not 
only the language contained in the release itself but by the 
testimony of Mr. Randall and the circumstances surrounding the 
release. 
The plaintiff admitted that the release clearly told her 
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that she was waiving all of her rights by sioning it. She made 
her "change of mind" upon a telephone conversation with Randall 
who allegedly assured her that the release did not mean what it 
really said. Plaintiff herself never claimed that Randall 
told her that the typed language at the top of the release 
agreement cancelled out the other language at the bottom. 
In fact, she could not recall whether the typed language was 
present even before she spoke with Randall. 
While Randall could not recall the specifics of the con-
versation per se, he stated that he did recall talking to the 
plaintiff and that he was sure he would have given her the same 
answer that he told all claimants concerning the release form. 
Plaintiff produced no evidence showing any motive why Randall 
would want to misrepresent or trick the plaintiff into signing 
the release. Randall's testimony was completely consistent 
that he would never have told her that the release covered only 
property damage and was in direct contradiction to any claim 
made by the plaintiff. 
It is always a question for the trier of fact to determine 
whether a Plaintiff sustains the burden of proof in attacking 
a release on grounds of fraud. Ketchum v. Wood, 438 P.2d 596 
(Wash. 1968). It is also the perogative of the trier of fact 
to determine the weight to be given the testimony of witnesses 
and wherever there is any circumstance which reasonably provides 
a basis for refusing to find in accordance with a witness' testi-
mony the trier of fact may do so. One element which may be so 
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considered is the interest of the witness. Aagard v. Dayton & 
Miller Ready Mix Concrete Co., 361 P.2d 522 (Utah 1961). 
In Melvin v. Stevens, 458 P.2d 977 (Ariz. 1969) the exact 
type of claim was asserted. In that case the plaintiff contended 
that the adjuster told her that signing the release was only 
for the damage to her car alone. The adjuster claimed that 
while he advised the plaintiff to wait awhile and see what 
developed as to her injury that she nevertheless chose to go 
ahead and sign the release to get the money for a new car. 
The Arizona court stated: 
It is not within our province to determine 
whether the conversation as described by Reece 
(the adjuster) took place; that was purely a 
question of fact to be determined by the trial 
judge and he evidently found it to be true. 
We cannot reverse his decision under these facts. 
at 980). 
The trial court in the instant case could also have con-
sidered evidence that was not produced by the plaintiff. For 
example, Plaintiff introduced no evidence showing that she 
ever attempted to submit medical claims to State Farm after the 
release had been signed. Since she testified that she believed 
the release only covered property damage, the question could be 
asked why she did not submit her excess medical bills to State 
Farm for payment. The record shows that the only notification 
of any claim against the release was the actual filing of the 
lawsuit over two years after the release had been signed. 
Respondent submits that not only was there failure of 
clear and convincing proof of fraud but there was a failure of 
-15-
any proof of fraud. The evidence shows that the plaintiff 
some five weeks after the accident elected to immediately 
receive her payment for the property damage to her automobile. 
The lower court could have believed that she was upset when 
she learned she had to give up all claims against State Farm 
in order to receive this amount but she later decided to execute 
the release anyway based upon her assumption that her own 
insurance carrier would cover her expenses and that she was not 
seriously harmed. 
It should be noted here that the plaintiff failed to 
produce any evidence as to the exact extent of her injuries at 
the time the release was signed or the amount of medical bills 
that she had expended at that time. The lower court could 
correctly infer that this failure to produce evidence showed 
that while Plaintiff knew she had sustained some injury from the 
accident she did not believe it was very serious and therefore 
agreed to execute the release to expedite her property damage 
claim. 
Thus, the facts and evidence in this case show no clear 
and convincing proof that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced into 
executing the release. It was the lower court which was able 
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to decide the 
sincerity and truthfulness of this testimony. This conclusion 
should not be upset by this Court in the absence of clear abuse 
or misapplication of the law. Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802 
(Utah 1967). 
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that Utah statutes and insurance 
resulations create a confidential relationship which somehow 
shifts the burden of proof in these types of cases. This 
argument is completely irrelevant to this appeal. 
First, unlike the California case cited by Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 27) no action has ever been initiated 
against either State Farm Insurance Co. or the adjuster. Second, 
the regulations upon which Plaintiff relies were not even in 
effect at the time of the events of this case as admitted by 
Appellant herself. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30). 
Finally, to equate the role of Mr. Randall in this case 
to that of a confidential advisor is completely baseless. For 
example, in the In re Swan Estate case cited by Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 28) a close friend and attorney drafted 
the will of the deceased and named himself as a beneficiary. 
This type of a relationship can hardly be said to exist in the 
instant case. 
Here, Mr. Randall was an insurance agent representing the 
defendant who collided with Plaintiff in the automobile accident. 
There was no contractual relationship existing between Randall 
and the plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff had not even personally 
met Randall but only spoke with him on the telephone. The evi-
dence does not support any finding of a close personal relation-
ship of trust and confidence. 
Respondent agrees that insurance agents have duties to both 
their own insured and to adverse parties. Respondent readily 
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admits that any insurance agent 11ho is of 1vrongdoing 
should be disciplined by the insurance industry or by the state. 
It may even be, as Appellant now asserts, that some type of 
civil cause of action could be asserted based upon the newly 
enacted regulations and statutes. However, the present appeal 
does not involve any such fraudulent or unethical conduct nor 
does the present state of the law allow any such civil action 
being maintained. 
The presumptions and burdens in this type of case are clear. 
Appellant's attempt to shift these presumptions and to claim 
an undue influence is neither legally nor factually supported 
in this record. 
The lower court was correct in concluding that the plain-
tiff failed to meet her obligation in proving any of the defenses 
asserted against a general release form. As such, the release 
was binding and Plaintiff was precluded from maintaining this 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Without being melodramatic, it is fundamental that written 
documents maintain their integrity if the economic and legal 
system is to function. It is for this reason that extreme high 
standards have been established by courts if a party is to set 
aside a written document and to take a position directl contrary 
to it. 
The release in this case is clear, as a matter of law, 
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and prevents Plaintiff from now asserting a claim against 
Defendant for personal injuries and medical expenses. Plain-
tiff herself knew of the consequences of signing such a docu-
ment and was aware of the language of the document from her 
own admitted testimony. 
It was up to the trial court to decide whether Plaintiff 
sustained her '.:lurden in 0•1erturning the effect of this agreement. 
It was the trial court which heard the testimony of all the 
witnesses and which had the opportunity of observing their 
demeanor during testimony. While Plaintiff can certainly 
argue the facts to show an alleged misrepresentation, Defendant 
can argue the facts to show that no such misrepresentation 
occurred. The trial court was the exclusive judge of this 
testimony together with all inferences and implications 
arising from the acts and omissions of the parties. 
The lower court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the 
release was invalid. The lower court sustained the validity of 
the written document based upon a full evidentiary hearing. 
Respondent submits that this decision was correct and therefore 
it should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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